The Legal Relationship of Conscience to
Religion: Refusals to Bear Arms
Religion and conscience are inherently ineffable concepts;' but to
recognize that they are indefinable is not to suggest that the relationship
between them cannot or should not be defined. Indeed, in the context
of federal statutes granting conscientious objector exemptions to the
requirement of military service 2 and to the required swearing of an
oath to bear arms on behalf of the United States,3 the legal system has
been forced to define this relationship. In treating refusals to bear arms,
Congress and the courts have had to decide whether religion is inclusive of conscience or whether conscience is the larger concept, of which
religious beliefs are a part.
In constitutional terms, conscientious objection involves two distinct
questions: whether the first amendment compels an exemption for
conscientious objectors; 4 and whether Congress may limit the exemption to those with religiously based opposition to the bearing of arms.5
The first question is not dealt with here; it has been treated exhaustively elsewhere6 and the most that one can ultimately conclude is that
1 See generally P. TLLicH, DYNAMICS oF FArTm (1957); United States v. Kauten, 133

F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
2 Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 60), 50 U.S.C. § 456(6) (Supp. V, 1965-69):
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term
"religious training and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.
8 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1964), provides
for an exemption to the required swearing of an oath to bear arms for ". . . a person
who shows by clear and convincing evidence . . . that he is opposed to the bearing of
arms in the Armed Forces of the United States by reason of religious training and
belief . . .

4 This question is essentially whether the free exercise clause requires the recognition
and protection of the beliefs upon which the objector's opposition is based through
an exemption of the objector from military service or from the oath to bear arms.
5 The question here is essentially one of whether restriction of the exemption to
those with religiously based opposition constitutes an impermissible classification or
denial of due process in contravention of the fifth amendment. However, it might also
pose an establishment-of-religion issue: Does the granting of an exemption on the basis
of religious beliefs and the denying of exemption to nonreligious objectors constitute
such a benefit to religion as to be an establishment of religion?
a See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development,
Part 1. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HAav. L. Ray. 1381, 1411-16 (1967); Mans-
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the Supreme Court has preferred to construe the statutory language7
so as to avoid the first amendment question.8 An answer to the second
question, involving the propriety of exempting only religious objectors,
field, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, 1965 RELIOcoN & PUB. ORDER 3; Comment,
The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There but for the Grace of
God . . . . , 34 U. CH. L. REv. 79 (1966); Note, Conscientious Objectors: Recent Developments and a New Appraisal, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1426 (1970).
7 See discussion of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), in text at note 49
infra, and of United States v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333, (1970), in text at note 96 infra.
8 The authorities generally cited for the proposition that exemption is a matter of
legislative grace either treat that proposition in dicta or have been substantially questioned by later cases. In Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 US. 366 (1918), the Court stated
that " . . the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes
the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need .. ."
Id. at 378. The case involved an attack upon the Selective Draft Act of 1917 by persons
who did not claim to be conscientious objectors but, rather, argued that the Act could
not be constitutionally applied to them because it exempted certain types of conscientious objectors and ministers of religion. Thus, the decision of the Court, sustaining
the application of the Act to the petitioners, did not answer the question whether
Congress is bound to grant any exemption, but rather answered the question whether
it is permissible for Congress to draft all eligible men who are not members of the
exempt group. The 'Court's statement that "we pass without anything but statement
the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free
exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses
of the act . . . because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do
more," id. at 389-90, may support Congress' right to exempt one group and draft others,
but it cannot be read as supporting the right of Congress not to grant an exemption
to anyone and draft all.
The other authority generally cited to support the legislative-grace proposition is
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). The Court, through Justice Sutherland, rejected as "astonishing" the statement made in Macintosh's brief that it was a
fixed principle of the Constitution that a citizen could not be forced to bear arms
against his conscientious scruples: "Of course, there is no such principle of the Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation
to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve

him." Id. at 623.
But Justice Sutherland was speaking to a question not before the Court. This point
did not escape the dissenters. Chief Justice Hughes, with Justices Brandeis, Holmes,

and Stone concurring, pointed out that the question before the Court was not "whether
the Congress may in its discretion compel service in the army in time of war or punish
the refusal to serve," but whether by the general language relating to the oath of alle-

giance Congress intended to impose as a requirement for naturalization that an alien
promise to bear arms in defense of the country notwithstanding his conscientious scruples. Id. at 627 (dissenting opinion).
Finally, Justice Sutherland's Macintosh statement was certainly undercut when Macintosh was expressly overruled in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). There,
the Court, relying on the Hughes dissent in Macintosh, held that the refusal to promise
to take up arms did not indicate a lack of attachment to our institutions, nor render
a person incapable of taking the oath of allegiance. While Girouard does not affirmatively create, by overruling Macintosh, a constitutional right to exemption, it certainly
does destroy any authority Macintosh may have provided for the proposition that no
such right exists.
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requires a definition of the legal status of conscience in relation to
religion.9
This comment will trace the legal system's consideration of this
relationship to the present. The thesis presented is that the two most
recent judicial decisions in this area, Welsh v. United States0 and In re
Weitzman," adopt a view that in the past had only minority recognition. This view construes the legal concept of conscience to include
both sincerely held religious beliefs and sincerely held, nonreligious,
conscience-based beliefs. This comment will assume that beliefs which
are derived from the "compelling voice of conscience" are a fortiori
sincerely held.1 2 Thus, the terms "conscientious objector," "conscientiously held," or "conscientiously opposed," will be used to signify a
belief, position, or opposition that is both conscience-based and sincerely held.
I.
A.

PAST EXPRESSIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF
CONSCIENCE TO RELIGION

Pre-1948 Statutory and Case Law

1. The Experience with the Draft Act of 1917. Since the First Congress considered Madison's proposal to protect, along with religion,
"the full and equal rights of conscience,"1 3 the relationship between
9 Many courts have failed to isolate the two separate questions, and thus make statements confusing answers to the first question with answers to the second. For example,
both questions were before the Ninth Circuit when the constitutionality of the Selective
Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, which inserted a requirement of a belief in a Supreme
Being for conscientious objectors, was challenged by objectors whose opposition to the
bearing of arms was based neither on a command from a Supreme Being nor on any
then recognized religious belief. In George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 US. 843 (1952), the petitioners argued that either their beliefs placed
them within the class to whom Congress extended the exemption or the Act contravened

the "free exercise" clause. Non-exemption, it was argued, placed a burden on the free
exercise of those beliefs which were the basis of their opposition. The Ninth Circuit,
relying on the Selective Draft Law Cases and United States v. Macintosh, held that because Congress can grant or withhold the exemptions as in its wisdom it sees fit, it
follows that

".

. . Congress . . . may deny [the exemption] to persons whose opinions

the Congress does not class as 'religious' in the ordinary acceptance of the word." Id.
at 450. Such reasoning is fallacious: its major premise is based on inconclusive dicta
and an overruled case and the conclusion drawn is a non sequitor. It does not follow
from the premise "that no exemption is required," that Congress may grant the exemption to any class that itwishes, while denying the exemption to any other class it
wishes, on whatever ground itwishes.
10 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
11 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970).

12 See note 115 infra.
13 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789). It isimportant to note the precise phraseology of
Madison's proposed first
amendment because the language suggests not the identification
or subsumption of conscience under the legal concept of religion, but the independent
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religion and conscience has received the occasional attention of Congress and the legal system. 14 But this attention was never close or
sustained until the 1917 Draft Act forced consideration of this relationship in connection with refusals to bear arms. The Act exempted a
member of "any well-organized religious sect or organization... whose
existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in
any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious
organizations. . .

.",

The exemption was thus twice confined. First,

exemption was available only to members of religious sects. Second, it
extended only to members of historic, pacifist religious sects, even
though religious opposition to war is not necessarily synonymous with
pacifism.' 6
The administrative difficulties in determining which sects were both
religious and traditionally pacifist and the basic unfairness of the
pacifist sect limitation were quickly recognized. President Wilson
attempted to deal with the problems by executive order, providing
that all draftees conscientiously opposed to combatant services, either
on religious or nonreligious grounds, be assigned to noncombatant
duty.17 The Secretary of War rejected the restriction to members of
pacifist sects, and ordered that a broader scope of exemption be applied. 18 Harlan Fiske Stone, writing of his experience in applying these
directives, 9 made clear the relation of conscience to religion implicit
in them:
existence of claims of conscience worthy of constitutional protection: "The civil rights
of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in

any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id.
14 For a bibliography of the documents illustrating the place of conscience in the
American legal and legislative traditions, see L. ScHsLwSSE,

CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA (1968).

The American consideration of conscience did not begin in an intellectual vacuum.
The most concise treatment of the concept of conscience in Western thought is H.
CHADwseK, SOME REFLEcnONS ON CONSCIENCE (1969). See also P. Tmmcn, TnE PROTESmANT
ERA 136-50 (1948); Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806

(1958).
15 Selective Draft Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 78.
18 For criticism of the second characteristic, see Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief
Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CoRNEMI L.Q. 281,
288 (1966).
17 Exec. Order No. 2823 (Mar. 20, 1918).
18 US. DEP'T OF WAR, STATEMENT CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBjEcTogs IN THE ARMY (1919). The Secretary of War directed that until further instructions on the subject were issued, "personal scruples against war" would be considered
as constituting "conscientious objection" and that such persons would be treated in the
same manner as other "conscientious objectors .... " Id. at 89.
19 Stone was one of the three members of a War Department Board of Inquiry that
traveled to army posts, interviewed in-service objectors, and granted exemptions to
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While conscience is commonly associated with religious convictions, all experience teaches us that the supreme moral
imperative which sometimes actuates men to choose one
course of action in preference to another and to adhere to it
at all costs may be disassociated from what is commonly recognized as religious experience. . . . [B]oth morals and sound
policy require that the state should not violate the conscience
of the individual. All our history gives confirmation to the
view that liberty of conscience has a moral and social value
which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the
state. So deep in its significance and vital, indeed, is it to the
integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature that nothing
short of the self-preservation of the state should warrant its
violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state
which preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the
conscience of the individual will not in fact ultimately lose
20
it by the process.
Stone's statements indicate that the class of exempted persons under
the 1917 Act, as administered, included not only those whose opposition to military service was based exclusively on religious beliefs, but
also those whose opposition derived from nonreligious, consciencebased beliefs.
2. United States v. Macintosh.2 1 Between the wars, problems of the
scope of protected conscience arose in the administration of naturalization law. Perhaps the most significant consideration during this
period of the relationship between conscience and religion was the
dissent of Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh. Macintosh, a Canadian minister and war veteran, refused to take the required
oath to bear arms without a proviso that he would participate in war
only after first determining the morality of the war and whether it was
in conformity with the will of God. The majority affirmed denial of
citizenship with this absolutist statement: "We are a Christian people
. . . whose government must go forward upon the assumption, and
safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance to
Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well
as those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with
the will of God.122 Hughes' dissent to this position emphasized the
"happy tradition" developed by the Court, of "avoiding unnecessary
those whose self-described beliefs placed them within the scope of exemption and who
were also found to be sincere in those beliefs.
20 Harlan Fiske Stone. The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLuM. U.Q. 253, 263, 269
(1919).
21 283 US. 605 (1931). See more detailed statement of this case, note 8 supra.
22 Id. at 625.
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clashes with the dictates of conscience." 28 The Chief Justice went on to
treat protected conscience as a concept inclusive of more than religious
beliefs whose favored constitutional status was already clearly established. For example, Hughes stated that "[t]he battle for religious
liberty has been fought and won with respect to religious beliefs ...
upon the very ground of the supremacy of conscience." 2 4 As did Stone
in administering the 1917 Act, the Macintosh dissenters, joined by
Stone who was by then on the Court, considered the class of exempted
persons to contain not only those with religiously based opposition, but
also those whose opposition derived from nonreligious, "conscientious"
sources.
3. The 1940 Selective Service Act and United States v. Kauten. 25 The
Selective Service Act of 1940, when compared to the language of the
1917 Act, appeared 2 6 to broaden the scope of the conscientious objector
exemption. It provided that: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be
construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training
... who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form." 27 Thus, although the
1940 Act did extend the exemption to conscientious objectors who were
not members of pacifist religious sects, it did not exempt all those who
would have been excused under the 1917 Act as administered. The
1940 Act, with the insertion of "by reason of religious training and
belief," rejected the Stone-Hughes suggestion that the scope of protected conscience should extend beyond religious-based conscience.
The central test for exemption under the new Act was not whether a
person's beliefs were conscience-based, as Stone and Hughes had suggested, but rather whether the beliefs were "religious"2 - within the
statute as interpreted by the courts. The courts, however, disagreed as
to the proper interpretation.
In United States v. Kauten29 the Second Circuit interpreted the
statutory language expansively (some commentators would say recalcitrantly),8 0 creating a "compelling voice of conscience test." The Second
23
24
25

Id' at 634.
Id.
133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).

26 See, e.g., Note, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1734, 1735

(1969).
27 Ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
28 The congressional intent behind the 1940 Act was to restrict the exemption to

those with clear religious objection. See Hearings on HR. 10132 Before the House Comm.
on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 191, 201-11, 450-59 (1940).

133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
80 Several commentators state unequivocally that the Second Circuit's opinion was
not in accord with the will of Congress. See, e.g., Conklin, Conscientious Objector Pro.
29

Conscience and Religion

19711

Circuit did not presume the relationship of conscience to religion to
be an equation, as one commentator concludes,31 but a relation of
logical identity between conscience and religion. That is, while conscience is not religion, certain conscience-based beliefs are sufficiently
analogous to religious beliefs as to be entitled to the legal protection
granted religious beliefs.3 2 The court affirmed Kauten's conviction for
failure to appear for induction because it was "not convinced ... that
the registrant did not report for induction because of a compelling
33
voice of conscience, which [it would] regard as a religious impulse."
The Second Circuit later applied the "compelling voice of conscience"
test to exempt a nonreligious objector in United States ex rel Phillips
v. Downer,3 4 holding that one who objected primarily on ethical and
humanitarian grounds was entitled to the exemption. The court
pointed out that "if a stricter rule than was announced in the Kauten
case is called for, one demanding a belief which cannot be found
among philosophers, but only among religious teachers of recognized
organizations, then we are substantially or nearly back to the requirement of the Act of 1917 . . .,,5
The Second Circuit's denial of exemption in Kauten, however,
indicates one limit on the expanded legal concept of conscience. There
was evidence, cited by the Second Circuit, in the report of the hearing
commissioner that "[t]here is no doubt that the Registrant is sincerely
opposed to war but this belief emanates from personal philosophical
conceptions arising out of his nature and temperament, and which is to
some extent, political."3 0 The Second Circuit concluded from such
visions: A View in the Light of Torasco v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252, 270-74 (1963);
Waite, Section 5(g) of the Selective Service Act, As Amended by the Court, 29 MNDN. L.
REV. 22, 27-35 (1944).
31 Note, supra note 26, at 1735.
32 M.

KONvIrz,

RELIGOUS

LBERTY AND

CoNscIENcE:

A

CONsruTIoNAL INQUIRY

105

(1968), reviewed, Greenawalt, 70 COLuM. L. REv. 1133 (1970). Konvitz carries the analogy
argument to its logical extreme, arguing that there is a "peripheral right" of conscience
which should be added to the first amendment. See also Redlich & Feinberg, Individual
Conscience and the Selective Conscientious Objector: The Right Not to Kill, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 875, 888 (1969), in which the authors rely not on Kauten but on an analogy to
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in arguing that the right of conscience is

sufficiently analogous to the central meaning of the first amendment to warrant protection.
33 133 F.2d at 708 (emphasis added).
34

135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).

35 Id. at 524. See also United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944);

United States ex rel. Brandon v. Downer, 139 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944) (dictum). The
Second Circuit later recognized that its approach had been rejected elsewhere and

called for a definitive interpretation by the Supreme Court. United States ex rel. Reel
v. Badt, 152 F.2d 627, 631 (2d Cir. 1945).
386133 F.2d at 707 n.2.
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evidence that there were substantial indications that the registrant's
objections were based on "personal predilection or political and social
philosophy respecting the folly and futility of war."' 37 Thus, while
the court was willing to expand the legal concept of protected conscience to include more than purely religious beliefs, it excluded objection based on primarily political considerations.
The Ninth Circuit, in Berman v. United States,8 rejected the Kauten
approach. Rather than focusing on the meaning of the term "conscientiously" to determine whether exemption was warranted, the Ninth
Circuit emphasized the concept of "religion." The court defined
"religion" as "an individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority
higher and beyond any worldly one,"3 9 and held that
no matter how pure and admirable [appellant's] standard
may be, and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his
philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept
religion in the sense of that term
of deity cannot be said to be
40
as it is used in the statute.
It has been argued that the Selective Service Act of 1948, which
defined religious training and belief as "an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political,
41
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code,"
resolved the conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits in favor of
the Ninth and that "Congress apparently sought to foreclose the
broader Kauten interpretation and to define religion in terms of belief
in and duties toward a Supreme Being." 42 It is true that Congress, by
inserting its own definition of religion, did remove the precedential
value of the Kauten definition of religious belief as a "belief [which]
37 Id. at 708.
38 156 F.2d 577 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
39 Id. at 380. The court's definition was based on Chief Justice Hughes' Macintosh

definition of religion as the "belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation." 283 U.S. at 633-34 (dissenting opinion). But
given the full impact of the Hughes' dissent, and the inference from it that the class
of conscientious objectors must include not only religious objectors but also non-religious,
conscientious objectors, the use of the Hughes' definition by the Ninth Circuit to restrict the class of exempted persons undermines the purpose for which it was originally
intended.
40 156 F.2d at 881.
41 Ch. 625, 62 Stat. 613. Part of the definition is drawn from Hughes' dissent in
Macintosh, cited in Berman. But again, the use of Hughes' words to restrict the class
of conscientious objectors is contrary to his original intent in Macintosh to expand the
class.
42 Note, supra note 26, at 1736 & n.21.
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arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the
individual to his fellow-men and to his universe-a sense common to
43
men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized societies.
But the significance of Kauten does not rest on its attempt to define
religion, an attempt which the Second Circuit itself felt was unnecessary;4 the significance of Kauten lies rather in its treatment of conscience as a legal concept. Thus, Kauten is still important for its
recognition that the compelling experience of conscience is analogous
to the compulsion of a religious belief and that such conscience-based
beliefs should have analogous legal protection. The insertion of the
Supreme Being concept into the statute's language did not foreclose
this significance.
The 1948 Selective Service Act and United States v. Seeger 5
In Seeger the Supreme Court interpreted the 1948 Act to reverse the
legislative and judicial trend 6 of restricting the scope of protected
conscience. Seeger came before the Supreme Court as a consolidation of
three cases4 7 in which local draft boards had denied conscientious
objector status under the 1948 Act because the boards found that the
registrants did not claim opposition to war based on belief in a
B.

43 133 F.2d at 708.
44 Id.
45 380 US. 163 (1965).
46 See, e.g., Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
930 (1963); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882
(1956); George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
The general trend reversed by Seeger excludes, of course, the Second Circuit opinions,
which Seeger might be interpreted as having approved.
47 The Ninth Circuit in Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (1963), focusing on the
"religious" criterion imposed by the 1948 Act, had followed its Berman precedent to
define religion in terms of belief in a Supreme Being and to affirm the denial of conscientious objector status. In United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (1963), the Second
Circuit had recognized a possible conflict between § 6(j) and the establishment clause,
but avoided a constitutional decision by resorting to an expansive definition of religion
to include Jakobson's beliefs within the exemption. In United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d
846 (1964), the Second Circuit, focusing on the "conscientious" vel non quality of petitioner's objection rather than the "religious" criterion imposed by the Act, confronted
the constitutional question. It held the section unconstitutional as an impermissible
classification under the due process clause of the fifth amendment because the section
required that conscientious objectors believe in a Supreme Being, thus discriminating
against those whose sincere opposition was based upon conscientious grounds other
than belief in a Supreme Being. Id. at 854. Relying on Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1946), and Torasco v. Watlins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), both of which were decided
on first amendment grounds, and its own decision in Kauten, to reverse the conviction,
the court stated that the due process clause prohibits the drawing of a legally consequential line between a person "obeying the dictates of his conscience or the imperatives of an absolute morality," and a person responding to "the will of a supernatural
power." 326 F.2d at 851-53.
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Supreme Being. Certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict in decisions between, not surprisingly, the Second and Ninth Circuits. The
48
sincerity of the registrants was not at issue.
The controlling question in Seeger was whether the distinction between sincere opposition based on a religious belief in a Supreme
Being, for which the protection of Congress was granted in the form
of an exemption, and sincere opposition to war based on beliefs commonly understood to be moral and not characterized by their holders
as religious, for which no exemption was granted, was an unconstitutional violation of the establishment or due process clauses. The
Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question, preferring to
construe the statute as establishing a test of religion which "avoids
imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs,
exempting some and excluding others .... -49 "[T]he test of belief in
a 'religion to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption." 50
While the Seeger test did somewhat abruptly end the ongoing trend of
restricting the class of conscientious objectors entitled to exemption, it
did not reverse the relative positions of religion and conscience established by the 1948 Act. Rather, the Seeger test, by focusing on and
expanding the concept of religion instead of the concept of conscience,
made it possible for some, but not all, moral objectors, whose beliefs
had previously been defined as nonreligious, to move within the
exempted class-but only because those beliefs were defined under
Seeger as religious.5 ' Seeger did recognize that some beliefs which the
48 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166-69 (1965).
40 Id. at 176. This is not to say that Seeger has no constitutional significance, for it

is unlikely that the Court would have adopted via strenuous construction such an
expansive definition of religion had it not believed that such a definition was constitutionally required to establish that neither the purpose nor the primary effect of the
statute was the advancement or the inhibition of religion. Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
50 380 U.S. at 165-66.
51 This point can be made by asking the question: After Seeger, does one who denies
holding any religious belief whatsoever, however religion be defined, but who adheres
sincerely to some moral principle outside his own self-centered existence, have a right
to exemption? One commentator has argued that Seeger made it logically impossible
for even an atheistic, nonreligious objector to fall outside the exempted class, for every
sincere disbeliever either "adheres to one of the variations on the theme of universal,
humanistic Goodness or else his views are such that he cannot qualify . . . for the
statutory exemption afforded those who are conscientiously opposed to the taking of
life, and if he does adhere to such a system of belief he, ipso facto, is not an 'atheist.'"
Rabin, supra note 16, at 244. Another commentator points out that under Seeger, if one
is conscientiously opposed to the taking of life, he is not in law an atheist, whatever
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holders may characterize as moral and "which are based upon a power
or being, or upon faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent" 52 are "religious" beliefs within the
meaning of the statute, no matter what they are to the holders or are
in fact. 53 However, Seeger expressly refused to extend the exemption to
objectors whose opposition is based on purely personal moral codes.
Thus, after Seeger, conscientious objectors entitled to exemption still
54
had to be "religious" objectors.
Two ideas presently discussed in non-legal ethical contexts provide
the basis for a critique of the Seeger test. First, since the test focuses on
the position that the belief occupies in the objector's life, it asks an
ambiguous question. Assume the orthodox religious objector's opposition to war is founded on his belief, passed down to him through the
religious instruction of his parents, that there exists a God who is
he is in fact. Nevins, The Conscientious Objector and the Constitution, 22 N.Y.U. INmTA.
L. REV. 252, 258 (1967). While these points are cogent for those moral, "conscientious"
objectors whose opposition derives from a moral principle that recognizes the existence
of an ultimate concern outside the holder's existence, because such an opposition becomes
religious under Seeger, they cannot be made for all moral objectors. Seeger did not hold
that all moral opposition to war is religious within the meaning of the statute.
52 380 U.S. at 176.
53 The impact of Seeger was widely discussed by the commentators. See Brodie &
Southerland, Conscience, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court: The Riddle of
United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. Rlv. 306; Mansfield, supra note 6; Rabin, supra
note 16; Note, supra note 26.
54 The most perceptive of the many discussions of the "true" meaning of the Seeger
test concluded:
What the Court may mean is that the religious character of a belief is determined not by the place it occupies in the life of the believer, but by the place it
ought to occupy in his life, considering the fundamental character of the truths
that are asserted. The fact that a belief does occupy an important place in an
objector's life may be some indication that it is a belief of a sufficiently fundamental character to warrant characterization as a religious belief, but it is the
fundamental character of the truths asserted, and the fact that they address
themselves to basic questions about the nature of reality and the meaning of
human existence, that is the primary reason for characterizing a belief in these
truths as religious.
. . . If this is what the Court meant to say, the test does have a certain
"objective" quality to it. In this respect it does not require an inquiry into the
extent to which the belief has transformed the objector's life. It requires,
instead, attention to whether the questions to which the belief addresses itself
are of a certain character; it requires attention to the subject matter of the
belief more than the condition of the believer.
Mansfield, supra note 6, at 10.
If this is the meaning of the Seeger test, the test is to be praised for its rejection of
the major proposition urged in the Government's brief. The Government argued that the
presence or non-presence of reason in a belief may be used to distinguish between
conscientiously held moral beliefs, which are "reasoned" and not entitled to the legal
protection of exemption, and religious beliefs entitled to protection which, according
to the Government, are not the product of reason. Brief for Petitioner at 13-14. To
accept the Government's proposition would be to limit the exemption to those having absolute fundamentalist religious beliefs and to deny exemption to every man who thought
about the nature of faith or morality and the nature of war.
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worthy of being obeyed and who forbids killing. That belief may be
both the source and the authority for the religious objector's opposition
to war. It is the source of his opposition in that it provided the context
for his first hearing and understanding of the evil of war; it is the
authority for his opposition in that it is the compulsion, logical or
otherwise, behind his opposition. But assume an avowedly nonreligious
conscientious objector whose parents were deeply religious. The source
of his opposition, like the orthodox objector's, be the belief passed
down from his parents through their religious instruction. But the
authority for this nonreligious objector's opposition to war is his own
mature, personal, and nonreligious (perhaps even political) belief that
war is folly. The sources are parallel, the authorities diverse. The
Seeger test fails to say which, if either, is controlling.rr If the establishment of a religious source of the opposition is dispositive, then the
class of exempted conscientious objectors will be more inclusive than
if a religious authority for the objector's opposition must be established.
This ambiguity is evinced in the conflicting analysis and disposition
of the claims of self-described nonreligious, conscientious objectors
with early religious backgrounds. In two cases, the first from the
selective service context and the second from the naturalization context,
the courts presumed that the establishment of the religious source of the
alleged nonreligious objector's opposition qualified the petitioners for
exemptions under Seeger without even recognizing, let alone distinguishing, the possible construction of Seeger as requiring that one must
establish the religious authority for his opposition. In United States v.
Shacter5 6 the petitioner was an avowed atheist who had been raised as an
orthodox Jew. In religious instruction, his mother had taught him
that it was wrong to kill. Attempting to apply the Seeger test to
Shacter's beliefs, the court held three factors sufficient to qualify the
beliefs under the selective service statute: early religious training, his
mother's instruction in conscientious objection, and the religious
terminology in which Shacter couched his beliefs. Thus, the court
focused on the source of, not the authority for, Shacter's opposition,
and granted conscientious objector status to an atheist, viewing his
belief as religious under Seeger. The Shacter court failed to demonstrate that the petitioner's early religious training played an authority
role in his life, which one might argue is demanded by Seeger. Nothing
55 See generally Nowell-Smith, Morality, Religious and Secular, in CnmsriAN Ermcs
CoNTrMPoRARY PHILOSOPHY (I. Ramsey ed. 1966), for discussion of the sourceauthority distinction.
56 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968).
AND
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in the court's opinion even suggests that it was aware of the other
possible reading of Seeger. The ambiguity is realized in the naturalization context in In re Nomland.57 Nomland, like Shacter, was an atheist
with an undisputed religious background (Lutheran) as a child. The
court summarily concluded that the beliefs from which her opposition
derived were religious within the meaning of that term as set out in
Seeger.
The other side of the ambiguity inherent in the Seeger test is evinced
in the lower court decision of In re Weitzman. s For the district court,
the religious background of the nonreligious objector was not significant and the possibility that her objection may have derived from
religious sources was not even considered. Rather, the court, quoting
the petitioner's nonreligious description of her opposition, engaged in
an "authority" inquiry to conclude that the petitioner's objections were
not "religious" because Seeger required that the objector recognize
"some external force greater than man's relationship to man which
occupied a position in [the objector's] life tantamount to a God or a
Supreme Being."'59 The court held that the petitioner's beliefs were
clearly personal and thus did not entitle her to exemption.6 0
The second criticism of Seeger is that the reliance which the test
places on the "fundamental character of the truths or realities upon
which the petitioner relies" and on "whether the questions to which the
belief addressed itself are of a certain character [the character of a
fundamental truth]"' is misplaced. The presumption upon which this
reliance rests is that sincere religious beliefs, as opposed to insincere ones,
are always associated with a faith in the ultimate truth, the ultimate
reality of one's position. However, it has been cogently argued in nonlegal contexts that a religious belief may be understood as an intention
to behave in a certain way together with the entertainment of religious
"stories," associated with the intention in the mind of the believer.
That the stories are not "true" in any verifiable sense, nor even
believed to be true in the sense of being objectively verifiable, in no
way compromises the strength of the belief. 2 Consider, for example,
57 No. 264215 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 30, 1968) (opinion by Ferguson, J.).
58 284 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1968).
fi Id. at 517.
60 Id. at 517, 518.
61 Mansfield, supra note 6, at 10.
62 The noted "neo-orthodox" theologian, Karl Barth, in response to the criticism that
statements of religious beliefs cannot be verified in the sense that mathematical or

scientific statements can be proven, has argued that the essence of faith lies not in its
being open to scientific verification, but in the recognition that the man of faith must
constantly seek the ultimate truth that just as constantly escapes him. The essence of

faith is its search for understanding, not the limited propositional truth of religious
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the nature of a belief in the efficacy of Mass. Any legal test which requires that a belief be associated with a faith in the fundamental
certainty of one's position is asking for an assurance which is alien to
the nature of religious faith.
Finally, commentators who recognize the inadequacy of the Seeger
test attempt to salvage it with proposed clarifications or eloborations
which are overly conceptualistic and which create evident problems
of administrability. Thus, one suggests that there is a metaphysical
belief, a "cosmic warrant," which supplies the link between the conscience-based views and the religious views which are qualified for
protection. 63 Another suggests that if the conscientious objector can
establish ". . . a psychological commitment to and a system of moral
64
practices resulting from the belief," he is entitled to the exemption.
A third feels that if the beliefs asserted concern fundamental questions
and "a concept of ultimate dependence or subordination" they are "religious" beliefs within the meaning of Seeger.65 These suggested clarifications are merely restatements which themselves lack the potential to be
applied objectively and consistently. They illustrate the administrative
difficulties of the Seeger test's concern with defining the largely indefinable concept of religion, rather than with recognizing the consciencederived status of nonreligious, moral beliefs. 66
II.

THE PRESENT EXPRESSIONS: Weitzman AND Welsh

In In re Weitzman and United States v. Welsh the Eighth Circuit
and the Supreme Court accepted the reasoning of Stone, Hughes, and
language.

K. BARTH, ANsErM: FiDES QUAERENs INTELLECrUm (1930). But cf. A.J. AYER,

LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND

LoGic 102-20 (1952).

63 Nevins, supra note 51, at 259.
64 Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. Cm.
L. REv. 5383, 552 (1965).
65 Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54
VA. L. REv. 1355, 1366 (1968).
66 With the enactment of § 1(7) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.
§ 456(j) (Supp. V, 1965-69), Congress struck from the language of the previous Act, and
its definition of "religious training and belief," the reference to "an individual's belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation." Thus, the statute presently states merely that "the term 'religious
training and belief' does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code." Id. The term remains, however, in the naturalization
statute. Despite the legislative change in the selective service area, the courts continued to
apply the standard established in Seeger. For example, in United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d
360 (8th Cir. 1969), the court said: "We believe that the 1967 Act in eliminating reference
to a 'Supreme Being' and retaining the 'religious training and belief' clause has worked
no change in the requirements for a conscientious objector classification, and the construction placed upon the 1948 Act in the Seeger case is the applicable standard." Id.
at 366.
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Kauten that the proper focus of the test for exemption is on the "conscientious" quality of the belief, not its religiousness or nonreligiousness, and, therefore, that the class of exempted persons must be wide
enough to include those nonreligious believers whose opposition is
based upon the compelling voice of conscience. Weitzman and Welsh
also have a particular impact on the precise position of morality in
relation to religion and conscience, for they imply that all sincere
moral beliefs come within the legal concept of protected conscience,
and thus entitle their holders to exemption.
A. Weitzman
Weitzman involved an alien's application for citizenship. The application was denied by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In
the district court, petitioner contended that section 1448(a) of the
Immigration Act was unconstitutional because it granted an exemption
from the required oath to bear arms only to those who conscientiously
objected because of religious training and belief as that term is defined
in the statute. 67 Alternatively, petitioner argued that she qualified for
exemption as a "religious person" under the Seeger test.68 The district
court rejected both arguments solely on the basis of its finding, in line
with the naturalization examiner's decision, that the petitioner's refusal
to take the oath to bear arms or to perform noncombatant service was
based on a personal code rather than on the requisite religious training
and belief. 69 But the district court made the additional finding that the
petitioner's "sincerity is unquestioned" and that "her credibility is
almost beyond doubt."70 On appeal, petitioner questioned only that
portion of the district court's decision that related to the constitutionality of the statute, expressly agreeing with the district court's finding
that she was not a religious person.71 With the case in this posture,
both parties advised the Eighth Circuit that this case was one of first
72
impression at the appellate level.
In a split decision, the Eighth Circuit reversed, each judge filing a
67

See generally Brief for Appellant, In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970).

68 Id.
69 In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514, 515 (D. Minn. 1968).
o Id. at 516.
71 Brief for Appellant at 3,In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970). At the trial

the petitioner had described her opposition to the bearing of arms:
My pacifism is not based on any religious or cosmological beliefs. I am a pacifist
because of a biological push not a theological pull. As a human being, I have
an instinctive aversion to killing other human beings. I believe that this instinct
is natural and present in all human beings and is necessary for the preservation
of our species.

426 F.2d at 442.
72 Id. at 441.
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separate opinion. For Judge (now Justice) Blackmun, dissenting, the
question presented on appeal was controlled by the petitioner's express
acquiescence in the lower court's finding that she was not a religious
person. This stance, Blackmun believed, precluded application or
further extension of the Seeger parallelism test.7 3 Thus, the issue for
Blackmun was narrow and specific: "Is it constitutionally offensive to
deny naturalization to an alien solely because her conscientious objection, within the language of the applicable statute, is concededly based
on nothing more than 'a merely personal moral code' and arises not at
all 'by reason of religious training and belief'?" 74 Yet Blackmun later
added that the "constitutional issue becomes one essentially of classification as between the religious person, however that be defined, and the
expressly nonreligious." 7 5 Thus, Blackmun's second statement of the
issue appears to conflict with his earlier statement that the Seeger
parallelism test is out of the case on appeal. The very function of the
Seeger test at the time of Weitzman was to provide the prime, if not
only, means of drawing this line of classification between religious and
nonreligious persons. If, as Blackmun states, the constitutionality of
that line of classification is at issue in Weitzman, then, by implication,
Seeger is crucial to the decision. Yet Blackmun, excluding Seeger, concluded simply that since citizenship is a privilege, "although not to be
granted or withheld on unconstitutional conditions,"76, and not a
constitutional right, the statute may constitutionally draw a line of
classification between religious and nonreligious conscientious objectors.
Several points concerning Blackmun's decision should be noted.
First, one searches in vain in his opinion for an adequate recognition
that what he calls the constitutional issue logically involves two distinct
questions-whether any exemption is constitutionally compelled and
whether a restrictive classification of the exempted class is constitutional. Moreover, Blackmun indiscriminately cites cases concerning
the first question, which was not raised, to support his argument regarding the scope-of-exemption question. Second, Blackmun failed
even to discuss Kauten and the Second Circuit's "compelling voice of
conscience" test. This is a significant lapse in an opinion which is
otherwise remarkable for the range and number of cases cited, discussed, followed or distinguished. Third, and most important, Black73 Id. at 444, 448. Judge Blackmun suggested that such a possible expansive reading
of the Seeger test as including the petitioner's beliefs of conscience would have been
consistent with the decision in United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1969). Id,
at 444.
74 Id. at 440-41.
75 Id. at 448.

76 Id. at 450.
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mun's analysis and decision accept the 1948 Act's statement on the
superior position of religion in relation to conscience, the Act's focus
on the meaning of what is "religious" within the term of the statute
and not on the meaning of what is "conscientious," and, therefore, the
Act's restriction of the class of exempted persons to those with "religious objections." Given these three points, it would indeed have been
remarkable had Judge Blackmun "[a]s a member of an inferior federal
court... even in this permissive day"77 held for the petitioner.
Judge Heaney felt that the constitutional issue had to be reached:
In my view then, we must either construe the statute as
permitting all who sincerely object in conscience to bearing
arms to be excused from the oath or hold that the statute is
unconstitutional. I take the former course. 78
The extent to which the Seeger test is involved in and extended by
the Weitzman decision is manifest in Heaney's opinion. Indeed,
Seeger forms the premise for Heaney's explicit recognition of the legal
and constitutional status of conscience:
Seeger and subsequent cases have in all but word given
constitutional and statutory dignity to conscience. It is time
we do so in fact. To take this step is not to relegate religious
belief, to diminish its importance or to show hostility to it.
The step additionally recognizes that "to protect religion fully
it is necessary to protect conscience." 79
And finally, Heaney, citing Stone's statement as to the independence
of conscience from religious experience, 0 recognized that "[t]he idea
that nonreligious conscience deserves protection is not a new one." 8'
Judge Lay rejected the petitioner's attempt to force the constitutional
issue by withdrawing her argument that she was religious under
Seeger. Lay argued that "[t]here should be little question that Mrs.
Weitzman is a sincere pacifist, and in my judgment, qualifies as being
one who reaches this belief on 'religious' grounds. 8 2 Lay's conclusion
clarifies the legal relationship of conscience to religion:
77 Id. at 454.
78 Id. at 460.

79 Id. at 460-61, quoting M. KoNvrrz, supra note 32, at 104.

See text at note 20 supra.
81 426 F.2d at 461.
82 Id. at 457. As a child, Mrs. Weitzman had received considerable religious instruction. Thus Judge Lay's language might suggest that for him the Seeger test is passed
80

by a nonreligious objector where it is reasonably possible that the source of such objector's

opposition was the religious training that he received, while the authority for his objection is a "biological," political, or even economic push. See discussion of the source-

authority ambiguity in the Seeger test in text at notes 55-60 supra.
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Mrs. Weitzman has established her sincere belief as a conscientious objector on the basis of conscience and sincere
conviction. This should be ehough. To require her to further
justify this faith in scientific terms or as one of religious
orthodoxy is patently wrong. Under our constitution "reli3
gious" belief can mean nothing more.
While Judge Lay attempted to avoid the constitutional issue, his
extension of Seeger to Weitzman's conscientious beliefs has important
constitutional implications. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court in
Seeger would have resorted to strenuous construction and have adopted
such a broad definition of religion in the face of statutory language
requiring "belief in relation to a Supreme Being," if it had not felt
that such a definition was constitutionally required. Similarly, it is
unlikely that Judge Lay would have made the above-quoted expansive
statements that "Weitzman has established her sincere belief as a conscientious objector on the basis of conscience and sincere conviction" and
that "[u]nder our constitution 'religious' belief can mean nothing
more," if he did not realize that recognition of the equivalent legal
status of the compelling voice of conscience was constitutionally required.
It is always difficult to isolate the "law of the case" when the various
judges' perceptions and reasoning are as diverse as in Weitzman. But
the opinion of Judge Heaney, and to a lesser extent that of Judge Lay,
represent an adoption of the Stone-Hughes-Kauten position on the
relationship of conscience to religion, and strongly suggest the constitutional status of the "compelling voice of conscience." Both opinions
recognized an independent status for conscience apart from religion,
and both judges, in deciding whether the petitioner's belief entitled her
to exemption, focused not on whether those beliefs were "religious," but
on whether they were "conscientiously" held. Finally, by exempting the
petitioner, both judges recognized that the class of conscientious
objectors must be broad enough to include not only those whose opposition to war derives from sincerely held religious beliefs, but also those
whose opposition is nonreligious, yet is derived from "the compelling
voice of conscience."
B. Welsh
With Welsh v. United States84 these points became Supreme Court
law. Welsh, who had been convicted for refusing to submit to induction, claimed that he was exempted from combat and non-combat
83 426 F.2d at 458-59 (emphasis added).
84 398 US.- 833 (1970).
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service because he was "by reason of religious training and belief...
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."8' 5 The
Ninth Circuit, however, found that there was no religious basis for
Welsh's conscientious objector claim, and therefore affirmed the conviction. 6 A majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Black, found the controlling facts presented by Welsh "strikingly
similar to those in Seeger."'s Both Seeger and Welsh were brought up
in religious homes and attended church in their childhood, but in
neither case did the church teach its members not to engage in war at
any time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh continued his childhood religious ties into young manhood, and neither belonged to any
religious group or adhered to the teaching of any organized religion. 8
The Court noted that "[t]here was never any question about the sincerity
and depth of Seeger's convictions as a conscientious objector, and the
same is true of Welsh."8' 9 The Ninth Circuit had noted the government's concession that Welsh's "beliefs are held with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions." 90 But in both cases the Selective Service System had concluded that the beliefs of these men were
in some sense insufficiently "religious" to qualify them for conscientious objector exemptions under the terms of the statute.91 In both
Seeger's and Welsh's self-description of their beliefs there was the taint
of a political dimension, as well as a clear moral content, 92 and "Welsh's
conscientious objection to war was undeniably based in part on his
9
perception of world politics." 3
The majority in Welsh, as did Judge Lay in Weitzman, rejected the
petitioner's attempt to frame the constitutional issue by characterizing
85 Id. at 335.
86 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968).
87 398 U.S. at 335.
88 Id. at 336.
89 Id. at 337.
S0 404 F.2d at 1081.
91 398 U.S. at 337.
92 In Welsh the Court quoted from Seeger's letter to his local board:
My decision arises from what I believe to be considerations of validity from the
standpoint of the welfare of humanity and the preservation of the democratic
values which we in the United States are struggling to maintain. I have concluded that war, from the practical standpoint, is futile and self-defeating, and
from the more important moral standpoint, it is unethical.
398 U.S. at 338.
93 Id. at 342. The Court quoted from a letter that Welsh wrote to his local board:
I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see that the military
complex wastes both human and material resources, that it fosters disregard for
(what I consider a paramount concern) human needs and ends; I see that the
means we employ to "defend" our "way of life" profoundly change that way of

life. I see that in our failure to recognize the political, social, and economic
realities of the world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility as a nation.
Id. at 342 (emphasis in original).
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his belief as nonreligious: "The Court's statement in Seeger that a
registrant's characterization of his own belief as 'religious' should carry
great weight... does not imply that his declaration that his views are
nonreligious should be treated similarly. 94 Thus, Black phrases the
issue before the Court as precisely that which it faced in Seeger: "[the]
task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious [citing Seeger]." 95 As in Seeger, the Court again elected to
construe the statute broadly rather than to rely on the Constitution:
We certainly do not think that [the statute's] exclusion of
those persons with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code" should be
read to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about our
domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious
objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon consideration of public policy...
. . .On the basis of these beliefs [Welsh's belief that the
taking of life is morally wrong] and the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that he held them "with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions," .

.

.we think Welsh

was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector exemption. 96
With regard to the legal relationship of conscience to religion, two
points about the majority's opinion should be emphasized. First, Black
attempted a feat of the judicial sleight of hand. On the one hand, he
expanded the scope of exemption to include Welsh by giving explicit
recognition to the compelling voice of conscience. The concluding
sentence of Black's opinion suggested for the first time in a Supreme
Court majority opinion the logical conclusion to be drawn from the
Stone-Hughes-Kauten position and the Lay and Heaney opinions in
Weitzman: "that [the conscientious objector] section exempts from
military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if
they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war." 97
Thus, the majority virtually eliminated the "religious training and
belief" requirement, substituting a compelling voice of conscience test.
But Black's repeated analogies to Seeger, and his statement that "under
the standards set out here and in Seeger ...the registrant is a 'religious'
94 Id. at 341.
95 Id. at 389, quoting Seeger, 880 U.S. at 185 (emphasis in original).
96

Id. at

97

Id. at 844.

M-43.
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conscientious objector,"98 obfuscate the role of the legal concept of
conscience in the majority opinion.
The second point to be emphasized concerns the possibility of
exempting an objector whose beliefs are essentially political. While the
majority opinion stated that the statute "should [not] be read to
exclude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign
affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in
all wars is founded to substantial extent upon considerations of public
policy,"9 it made clear that to qualify under the Seeger and Welsh
standards the registrant's "views cannot be 'essentially political, sociological or philosophical.' "100 Thus, the Court, like the Second Circuit
in Kauten,'10 was willing to protect a conscientious belief that has a
recognizable political dimension, but only if it also has substantial
religious or moral dimensions.
Whereas the majority in Welsh reached its conclusions by statutory
construction, Justice Harlan reached the same position in his concurring opinion through constitutional analysis. Harlan asked whether the
statute "in limiting this draft exemption to those opposed to war in
general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the religious clauses of
the First Amendment.' ' 0 2 For Harlan, this issue was a resurrection of
the debate between the Second and Ninth Circuits in Kauten and
Berman.10 3 In the course of his opinion, Harlan cogently restated the
constitutional question in terms relevant to the relationship of conscience to religion: ".... whether a statute that defers to the individual's

conscience only when his views emanate from adherence to theistic
religious beliefs is within the power of Congress."'0 4 If the class of
conscientious objectors is limited to only "religious" objectors, and if
the statute prohibits the exemption from being extended to nonreligious
objectors whose beliefs are based on the compelling voice of conscience,
then the statute suffers from "unconstitutional underinclusion."' 05
Harlan suggested, therefore, that the conscientious objector exemption
should have been framed not in religious but in secular, ethical and
98 Id. at 343.
99 Id. at 342.
100 Id. at 343
101 See text at note 37 supra.

i02 398 U.S. at 345. Justice Harlan believes that the constitutional issue must be
reached because the liberties taken with the statute in Seeger and Welsh "cannot be
justified in the name of . . . construing federal statutes in a manner that will avoid
possible constitutional infirmities in them." Id. at 345. See Mansfield, supra note 6, at 6.
103 398 U.S. at 348-50. See text at notes 25-44 supra.

104 398 U.S. at 356.
105 Id. at 361, 364 n.16.
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moral terms. 10 Yet he concurred in the Court's conscientious objector
test, "not as a reflection of congressional statutory intent but as patchwork of judicial making that cures the defect of underinclusion in
[the statute] and can be administered by local boards in the usual
017
course of business.'
Finally, Harlan emphasized the significance of Welsh for the legal
relationship of conscience to religion:
Today the [Court] makes explicit its total elimination of the
statutorily required religious content for a conscientious
objector exemption. The [Court] now says: "If an individual
deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or
moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose on
him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any
war at any time (emphasis added)," he qualifies for . . .
exemption.108
III.

CiuT QuE OF THE PosT-Welsh TEST

Judicial' 0 9 and administrative'" decisions since Welsh have estab106 Id. at 357.
107 Id. at 366-67.
108 Id. at 345. In Welsh, Justice White dissented and filed an opinion in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined. Justice Harlan's use of judicial patchwork to
cure the statute's constitutional infirmity as an impermissible classification certainly
approaches, if indeed it does not reach, what Justice Frankfurter once said the Court
must not do:
Certainly this Court cannot be called upon to determine what claims of conscience should be recognized and what should be rejected as satisfying the "religion" which the Constitution protects. That would indeed resurrect the very
discriminatory treatment of religion which the Constitution sought forever to
forbid.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
majority had decided in this, the second flag salute case, that "the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations
on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control." Id. at 642.
Justice Frankfurter's dissent warrants reading in full because it presents the counterpoint
thesis of strict neutrality to limit just how far the "happy tradition" of avoiding clashes
with conscience can be carried: "No religion shall either receive the state's support or
incur its hostility." Id. at 654. See P. KUR.LAND, RELIsION AND THE LAW 41-47 (1962).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Rink, 430 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Coffey,
429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1970).
110 SELEcTiVE SFRv. Sys., LOCAL BD. MEORANDUM NO. 107 (July 6, 1970), purports to
establish guidelines that comply with Welsh. In describing those persons still excluded
from conscientious objector classification after Welsh, the memorandum states:
Persons whose beliefs are "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views,
or a merely personal moral code" are ineligible to be classified as a conscientious
objector. Such persons consist of two groups:
(a) Those with beliefs of religious, moral, and ethical nature, but whose beliefs
are not deeply held, and
(b) Those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or
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lished a two-part Welsh test to determine whether a registrant is
entitled to a conscientious objector exemption. First, does the petitioner's opposition to war derive from the compelling voice of conscience, or is it merely an opposition which "does not rest at all upon
moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency?". 1 Second, if the
opposition is based on conscience-derived beliefs, are those beliefs
sincerely held? Although the first inquiry is an accurate derivative of
Welsh, the second is questionable, for the petitioner's sincerity was not
at issue in Welsh.
A.

Comparison of the Welsh and Seeger Tests

The Welsh test avoids one aspect of conceptualism that was inherent
in Seeger-the non-administrable distinction between a sincerely held
moral belief and a sincerely held religious belief."12 Under Welsh, a
deeply held moral belief qualifies its holder for exemption if it is not a
"merely personal moral code." 1 3 The Seeger test, on the other hand,
religious principles, but instead rests solely upon consideration of policy, prag-

matism or expediency.
Id. The preamble and clause (b) of this statement are indeed part of the Welsh decision's
language. However, since Welsh's sincerity was not disputed, clause (a) cannot be said to
come from the Welsh decision. But even more important, a literal reading of the preamble
and clause (a) reveals that a registrant with religious, moral, or ethical beliefs who is
found to be insincere in those beliefs becomes, by some unknown operation, a person
"whose beliefs are 'essentially political, sodological, or philosophical views, or a merely
personal moral code.'" Such a transformation is not only logically absurd but certainly is
not supported by anything in Welsh. A person with religious, moral, or ethical beliefs who
is found to be insincere, is not by the mere fact of insincerity transformed into a person
with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views." In these respects, the
memorandum seems to misconstrue the precise meaning of Welsh.
111 398 U.S. at 342-43.
112 The elimination of the task of having to distinguish moral, conscientious beliefs
from religious, conscientious beliefs is certainly sound because of the ease with which a
belief which the holder thinks is moral can be described and treated as a religious belief,
and vice versa. For example, even an orthodox religious opposition based on a belief in a
Supreme Being can be said to be based on a more fundamental belief that that Supreme
Being is wholly good and worthy of being obeyed. Such a fundamental religious belief is
itself a very large moral belief. See generally Nielsen, God and the Good: Does Morality
Need Religion? THEOLOGY TODAY, April 1964, at 47. As noted in text at note 53 supra,
the opposition of a nonreligious, moral objector, if that moral belief is directed toward
some ultimate concern, is defined to be religious by Tillich and Seeger. Given the
reversibility of the characterizations by registrants of their beliefs and that any one
belief can be validly described either as religious or moral, it is not desirable to have
the courts attempting to distinguish the "really religious" from the "only moral."
113 398 U.S. at 342. Given the expansive statement of Justice Black that "all those
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral ... beliefs" are exempted, it is difficult
to conceive of any sincerely held moral belief which would now be characterized as a
"merely personal moral code." Id. Yet the Selective Service System continues to emphasize
that persons with merely personal moral codes are excluded. See S.tEcrivE SEav. SYs.,
LoCAL BD. MEmoaANDum
No. 107 (July 6, 1970), quoted in part in note 110 supra.
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could exclude even an orthodox religious person from the class of exempted objectors, if either the source or authority of his opposition derived from a purely personal moral code that he held independent of his
religious belief. Seeger's distinction between religious and moral beliefs
suggests that these two concepts may occupy separate places in the life
of the objector and that the parallel-belief test may be used to isolate
those actions of the religious man which are compelled by his religious
beliefs from those actions which are compelled by his purely personal
moral code. Such a conceptualistic distinction could never be objectively and consistently applied.
The Welsh test, on the other hand, recognizes that a man does not,
unless schizophrenic, compartmentalize the moments of his life into a
religious period, a period of conscience, and a moral period; he is an
integrated personality. Seeger's assumption that courts and administrators can isolate the source of a conscientious decision in a man who is
both religious and moral is clearly presumptuous. The context shifts, 114
and religious beliefs are often inseparable from moral beliefs. The
Welsh test allows for such a shift; and because it does, this dimension
of the test is a step towards the development of an objective and administrable legal test.
B.

The Welsh Sincerity Inquiry

Practical considerations prohibit the legal system from accepting
without question the claims of alleged conscientious objectors. Local
boards and courts have utilized the sincerity test to determine the credibility of claimants. Yet the test, while serving a potentially useful
function, has often been administered in an abusive and inconsistent
manner.115
Although courts have said otherwise, a sincerity test cannot help but
be affected by the trier's opinion as to the truth or falsity of the belief.
United States v. Ballard"6 is generally cited for the proposition that the
114 See generally H. AIKEN, REASON AND CoNDucr: Nxw BEARINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

(1962).
315 See SEcLrIvE SEsv. Sys., LOCAL BI. MEMORANDUM No. 107 (July 6, 1970), quoted
in part note 110 supra, and United States v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1970). Both the
Memorandum and the case show that the sincerity test is being used as a corollary inquiry

which the purported objector must pass after his beliefs and opposition have been
determined to be conscience-derived and not solely a matter of policy, pragmatism, or
expediency under the initial Welsh inquiry. There is a distinct possibility that an
exhaustive inquiry into whether the objector's opposition is conscience-based renders
the second inquiry into sincerity logically unnecessary. Every conscience-based belief may
be a fortiori sincerely held.
116 322 U.S. 78 (1944). This case involved the mail fraud prosecution of the Ballards
of the "I Am" movement, who solicited money on the basis of assertions that Guy Ballard
was a divine messenger and that the Ballards could cure diseases.
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sincerity with which a belief is held is a proper question for the trier
of fact. The Supreme Court held in Ballard that courts should not try
to ascertain the truth or falsity of religious claims, but the majority did
not rule on whether the defendants' sincerity had properly been put
to the jury. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, argued that a state of mind
can be fraudulently misrepresented, and that a jury could examine
whether the Ballard's believed that they had had the experiences they
asserted. Justice Jackson, also dissenting, argued that judgments of
sincerity cannot be divorced from judgments of truth; if a juror thinks
that a belief is wildly implausible, he is likely to think also that it is
not sincerely held. Justice Jackson added that since people are often
skeptical about religious experience, it is hard to say where belief
ends and disbelief begins. Justice Jackson's remarks are equally applicable, after Welsh and Weitzman, to nonreligious, conscientious be7
liefs."i
The operation of the sincerity test after Welsh is illustrated in
United States v. Coffey." 8 Coffey had been convicted for refusing
induction. The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction because Coffey's
statements about his opposition, "[filf they were true, . . indicate that
Coffey's intensity of belief was such that his beliefs were based on
moral principle, [and that] he had made out a prima facie claim to
conscientious objector status." 119 Thus, the court based its reversal on
the grounds that Coffey had passed the initial inquiry required under
Welsh-he established that his beliefs were conscience-derived. The
court added, however, as dictum, that "[ilt would of course have been
open to the local board to deny Coffey conscientious objector status
upon a finding that his statement of beliefs was insincere,"'120 and the
court set forth two ways in which Coffey might have failed the sincerity
test:
First, it might have been determined that Coffey did not in
fact believe what he said he did-i.e., that he did not actually
believe that man was a Supreme Being or that men have a
special duty to preserve life. The local board might have based
such a determination, for example, upon prior statements or
actions of Coffey inconsistent with his stated beliefs.
117 The problem as it appears in the context of the relationship is presented by the
following language from United States v. Forsting, 304 F. Supp. 84 (D.N.D. 1969):
"[W]hile the 'truth' of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant
question whether it is 'truly held.' This is the threshold question of sincerity which

must be resolved in every case. It is of course a question of fact-a prime consideration
to the validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector." Id. at 86.
118 429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1970).
119 Id. at 405.
120

Id.
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Second, the board might have determined that, though Coffey
in fact believed what he said he did, his belief was not "deeply
held" within the meaning of Welsh . ..- i.e., that despite his
beliefs he could bring himself to kill in war, or that the
penalty for violating his beliefs would have been only a few
pinpricks of conscience, as opposed to the stern remorse
which the Welsh test requires. 121
The Ninth Circuit's first point, like the earlier Seeger test, seems to
suggest that sincere belief, as opposed to insincere belief, is associated
with some fundamental truth about which the holder is certain and
unwavering. But, as noted earlier with regard to the Seeger test,122 certainty in the truth of one's position is not the sine qua non of faith.
Skepticism of the certainty of one's position has been recognized in
theological circles, and even in legal circles, as a desired protection
against false idolatry, religious or legal. 23 It may be argued, however,
that it is theoretically possible to posit a sincerity test which would
enable the trier of fact to evaluate the sincerity or strength of the objector's belief without requiring the trier to find the underlying assumptions of the belief to be "true." For example, such a test would
require the trier to examine the registrant's belief that Christ was crucified, but would not necessitate a finding that Christ was, in fact, crucified. Even if this theoretically narrow sincerity test could be consistently and objectively administered, there remains the danger Justice
Jackson recognized in Ballard. A mere fact of demeanor, evincing that
the registrant is or is not truthful about his holding this belief, and the
ultimate fact that the belief is or is not ultimately true, are not irrevocably separated but are rather part of a continuum of facts associated
with the petitioner. It is still difficult to see how the trier's judgment
of sincerity can be divorced from a judgment of the truth or falsity of
the ultimate fact. There are no internal checks in the sincerity test to
insure that the trier will limit his inquiry to the demeanor-level facts
and not consider the ultimate truth of petitioner's beliefs.
With regard to the Coffey court's second point, the local boards
might have great difficulty in objectively and consistently distinguishing between those who would suffer only a "few pinpricks of conscience" if forced to serve and those who would suffer "stem remorse."
It is difficult to see how the fact that an objector really "could" force
Id. (emphasis in original).
122 See text at notes 54 & 61-62 supra.

121

128 See I P. TmLmcsH, SYSTEMATIC THEoLoGY 13, 216 (The University of Chicago Press

ed. 1967). See generally P. Tnucir, DYNAmics oF FArTH (1957); Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. Pjv. 457 (1897).
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himself to kill in war is relevant to the decision to withhold an exemption which traditionally has been granted to avoid coercing someone to
act contrary to his conscience. Yet the local boards, presumably to test
the sincerity of the registrant's conscientious beliefs, almost invariably
ask a registrant who has stated that he is opposed to killing for any
reason what he would do if a loved one were physically attacked in his
presence. Similarly, some courts, in deciding the cases of late-maturing
claims of in-service objectors, appear to consider the objector's willingness to engage in weapons training after his alleged "conscientious"
belief against the taking of life crystallized as significantly probative of
12 4
insincerity.
This approach assumes that the sincere "conscientious" objector
could not even entertain the possibility of acting contrary to the dictates
1 25
of his conscience. This assumption illustrates the general failure of
the legal system even to consider the proposition raised by eminent
philosophical and theological authorities, 1 26 that while the compelling
voice of conscience does speak "involuntarily and inevitably,"' 127 the
holder of conscientious beliefs can and often does choose to act contrary to his conscience. It would, however, be exceedingly difficult for
the legal system to adopt such a proposition, for the legal system traditionally judges subjective mental states by objective evidence. Yet
the possibility remains that acts contrary to the dictates of one's conscience prove only mortality, not insincerity.
Moreover, such use of a sincerity test frustrates any gains in administrability that might have been contemplated in the Welsh decision.
The Seeger test utilized a sincerity and strength of belief inquiry to
differentiate between "religious" opposition and "purely personal
moral" opposition. And this inquiry has been criticized herein as not
128
having the potential to be objectively and consistently administered.
Now the post-Welsh test, as administered in Coffey and by the Selective
Service Administration, attempts to use sincerity to distinguish religious
124 See, e.g., Speer v. Hedrick, 419 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1969).
125 But see United States v. Nordloff, No. 18,051 (7th Cir., Jan. 5, 1971). The question
on appeal was whether the crystallization of conscientious opposition beyond the registrant's control entitled him to a hearing to determine if he qualified for exemption.
While reasoning to its holding that the crystallization is beyond the control of the registrant, the court noted that "we can also control, when faced with the moral issue,
whether or not to follow the dictates of conscience." Id.
126 See W. JAMEs, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE 801-30 (Longmans ed. 1928); W. JAMES, THE
WILL TO BELIEvE 145-83 (Longmans ed. 1897); I. KANT, THE CRmu OF PRACrTICAL
REASON 311-12 (Longmans ed. 1954). See generally R. KR6NER, KANT'S ETiCAL r.ELTANSCHAUUNG (1956); I P. TILLnic, SYsTmAnxc THEOLOGY, supra note 123, at 182-86; II id.
at 129-31; I id. at 32-50.
127 I. KANT, supra note 126, at 311-12.
128 See text at notes 55-66 supra, and Note, supra note 26, at 1746-47.
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and moral opposition from opposition "which rest[s] solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency."' 129 If sincerity could
not be used to distinguish, objectively and consistently, religious from
moral objection, it is difficult to see why it could be used effectively to
distinguish religious and moral objectors entitled to the exemption
from philosophical, sociological, political and "merely personal moral"
objectors. 130 As the Court itself seemed to imply in Welsh, conscience
has a public responsibility where public matters are concerned. A "sincerity" test is of little use in deciding which objectors we will attempt
to coerce to abdicate their public responsibility, because their opposition is essentially political, philosophical, sociological, and which objectors we will exempt from the attempted coerced abdication of their
public responsibilities, because their opposition is religious and
moral.131
C. Exploitation by Highly Verbal Registrants
Finally, the Welsh test, like the Seeger test before it, may be criticized
for the advantage it gives to educated and articulate objectors who consciously or unconsciously can dress up their beliefs in statutory or judi32
cial language to minimize the difficulty in obtaining an exemption.
129 398 U.S. at 342-43. See SELECTVE S.Rv. SYs., LOCAL BD. MEMORANDUM No. 107 (July
6, 1970), quoted in part note 110 supra, and United States v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401 (9th
Cir. 1970).

130 398 U.S. at 342.
131 A recurrent theme in the judicial expression rationalizing the "happy tradition"
of avoiding "unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience," United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931), is the proposition that whatever is associated with
the compelling voice of conscience is necessarily good. This theme is nicely summarized
by Stone: "All our history gives confirmation to the view that liberty of conscience has
a moral and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of the
state." Stone, supra note 20, at 269. It has often been emphasized that one reason for
granting the exemption is that conscientious objectors are usually persons of good
character and exemplary citizens. See, e.g., Justice Holmes' remarks about the Quakers
in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (dissenting opinion). It has even
been suggested that exemption may reflect a belief by our society that conscientious
objectors perform a useful function by keeping alive the ideal of nonviolence and the
belief that war is not inevitable. Mansfield, supra note 6, at 69. In short, the legal system
has treated that conscience worthy of legal protection as being a good conscience. One
suspects that the sincerity test could be used to deny exemption to an objector who,
although his beliefs qualify under Welsh as conscience-based, is thought by the trier of
fact not to possess a "good" conscience, "good" beliefs, or be worthy of an exemption.
Such a potential abusive use of sincerity inquiry to disguise an impermissible ground for
denying exemption to the objector is another reason for distrusting the emphasis placed
on the sincerity test.
132 See generally SELEcrivE S:RV. Sys., LOCAL BD. MEMORANDUm No. 107 (July 6, 1970),
for evidence of the conceptualistic formulae inherent in the post-Welsh-Weitzman statement of the law on conscientious objection, waiting to be exploited by those sophisticated
enough to find the SSLR (SELE nvE SERvicE LAw REPORTER) volume in which the memo-
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The obstacles to less articulate, less educated objectors are graphically
illustrated in Gruca v. Secretary of the Army, 133 where Judge Tamm
compared Gruca's simplistic, naive description of his beliefs to Seeger's
and Welsh's glib, theologically sophisticated descriptions of their beliefs. It is perhaps possible that the legal system's consideration of the
relationship of religion to conscience has pursued not only just the
words, rather than the experience behind the words, but only the
sophisticated words.134
randum is reproduced. The dependence on the nuances of language is exhibited by the
informal commentaries written in the margins of the SSLR by prospective objectors
attempting to fit their opposition within the stated formulae.
The possibility of verbal manipulation makes some consideration of the purported
objector's credibility necessary to distinguish articulate but fabricated opposition from
sincere but naively expressed opposition. Thus the articulate objector must be wary lest
his articulateness and knowledge of draft law language be taken as fabrication. Just as
it is generally presumed that allowing one's witness to testify in the literal words of the
statute is disastrous trial strategy because it suggests fabrication by the witness, a purported objector's use of articulate words from judicial opinions and agency memoranda
could conceivably backfire.
133 No. 23,849 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 23, 1970). The case was a review of a draft board's
finding that Gruca was not entitled to be classified as a conscientious objector. His
appeal was denied.
134 In Bortree v. Resor, No. 24,607 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 2, 1971), the court recognized the
danger inherent in such a misplaced focus. The court reversed and remanded the district
court's decision that there was a basis in fact for the Army's disapproval of the in-service
petitioner's application for discharge as a conscientious objector. The Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. §§ 451 et seq. (Supp. V, 1965-69), authorizes judicial inquiry
into draft classifications "only when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned
to such registrant. Id. at § 460(b)(3). The court in Bortree stated:
An inference of insincerity could logically be drawn from the fact that an applicant for conscientious objector status expresses beliefs in a way which clearly
indicates that he is not familiar with them. However, many sincere young men
use language derived from their reading and from their moral and spiritual advisers to express their beliefs, and in so doing may give the impression that their
thoughts are not their own. Because of this phenomenon, Selective Service Boards
and the Army must exercise great care if they attempt to draw conclusions from
the manner in which an applicant phrases his beliefs.
Bortree v. Resor, supra.

